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Abstract
Over the past five years, the Salem, New Hampshire facility of Digital Equipment Corporation
("Digital") has undergone drastic changes in its layout and in the products it assembles. The
rapid closings of three North American plants and their subsequent consolidation into the Salem
facility were implemented, on average, over a period of only three months for each plant closing.
As the new businesses were added, Salem management had neither the time to consider the
strategic and operational impacts of changing the functions performed at Salem, nor the luxury to
redesign the facility to optimize material flows.
In the Spring of 1997, the Salem facility began a series of major reengineering initiatives whose
objective was to correct layout inefficiencies and optimize the functionality of the facility to
meet world class manufacturing standards. The goal to develop the facility into a contiguous and
integrated manufacturing organization was driven largely by increasingly strong competition.
The work performed for this thesis consisted of two major tasks: first, to undertake a strategic
and operational analysis to identify a superior factory layout given the addition of new functional
capabilities at the Salem facility; and second, to design a financial model to assess the
operational impacts of the proposed and on-going reengineering efforts. Both tasks involved a
team-based approach with Digital employees.
Five key recommendations and conclusions were made as a result of the analyses:
* Placing the order consolidation, shipping, and options fulfillment businesses in Core B of the
factory will allow for a superior flow of material through the Salem facility.
* Bringing the order consolidation, shipping, and options fulfillment functions into the Salem
facility will allow the factory to improve order delivery predictability and reduce total order
cycle time.
* By becoming more vertically integrated, the Salem facility has a much higher probability of
achieving its performance goals for FY'98.
* Accounting for opportunity costs not captured in other potential reengineering plans, the
proposed reengineering plan offers both a high return from direct program savings as well as
the potential for manufacturing capacity expansion.
* Accounting for the non-quantifiable benefits of the proposed reengineering program will
show that the long-term strategic rewards for Digital far outweigh any of the short-term
savings.
The remainder of this document describes the two tasks completed in greater detail, explains the
methodologies used in assessing the potential financial and operational impacts of the factory
changes, and justifies quantitatively the recommendations made above.
Thesis supervisors: Lawrence Wein, Professor of Management Science
Alvin Drake, Professor of Systems Science and Engineering
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Chapter I - Introduction
Problem Statement
The Salem, New Hampshire facility is one of six Digital factories currently in operation. Under a
mandate to make the Salem facility capable of meeting world-class manufacturing standards,
management has undertaken several key reengineering initiatives to reach this objective. As a
result of these initiatives, there exists a need to redesign the factory and improve material flows
within the factory. Furthermore, the overall strategic and financial impacts of all reengineering
efforts on a factory-wide basis (versus a project-specific basis) have not been evaluated. Thus,
this thesis answers two specific questions:
* What is a superior factory layout given the addition of new functional capabilities?
* What are the totalpotentialfinancial and operational benefits of the reengineering
initiatives at the Salem facility?
Approach and Methodology
A comprehensive approach was undertaken to complete the two tasks outlined in the Problem
Statement. First, relevant data was collected to assist the team in understanding the factory
environment and current issues. Each team was led by this author and consisted of two or three
other individuals from the Salem facility. Teams were formed to evaluate factory layout and
capacity issues, as well as financial impacts of the proposed changes. Second, on-site interviews
were conducted with key personnel to collect more specific data and other necessary information.
Third, models were developed to quantify costs and benefits of the proposed layout. Finally,
throughout the six-month internship, weekly meetings were held with an eight-person Steering
Committee, consisting of senior management from the Salem facility, to gain additional direction
on the "to be" scenario (i.e., future vision of the factory) and feedback on the analyses being
conducted.
The specific approach and methodologies used to complete the operational and financial analyses
were as follows:
* Strategic analysis of functional capability. From interviews with Steering Committee
members and a high-level process mapping of material flows (supplier, factory, distribution
center, customer), a strategic analysis of the "as is" and "to be" functions at the factory was
completed.
* Factory layout analysis. The initial analysis involved a "greenfield" approach. That is,
assuming the existence of an empty factory (or a "greenfield") and an opportunity to
completely redesign the factory layout given the "to be" functional capabilities, what would
the factory look like? Five potential scenarios were developed by the factory layout team and
presented to the Steering Committee for review. The Committee selected the most promising
factory layout based upon initial estimates of the time to implement, cost to implement,
disruption due to implementation, and anticipated benefits of the new layout once the
implementation was complete. Subsequently, a material flow analysis was performed using
the recommended layout. The objective was to determine whether the selected factory layout
minimized material flow as much as possible, thereby simplifying the flows and reducing the
amount of material handling required. As a result, a realistic and achievable factory layout
was developed to improve and simplify the flow of material across the floor.
* Factory capacity analysis. Using historical data on material receipts and planned capacity for
the factory's production, two spreadsheet models (for input and output) were created to make
recommendations on the number of dock doors required in the warehouse for receiving and
in Core B for shipping. Because of the analyses completed above (functional capability and
factory layout), there was a need to understand how the proposed changes would impact the
flow of material into and out of the facility.
* Financial impact analysis. In conjunction with the Finance Department, a net financial
impact analysis was performed using a spreadsheet model. Five iterations of the selected
layout were developed to account for potential changes in timing and capital availability and
include the costs and benefits of the other reengineering efforts occurring simultaneously.
As a result of these analyses, a Capital Appropriations Request (CAR) was developed to
summarize the work performed. The CAR was presented to Digital Corporate in November 1997
to justify the capital that was required to make the proposed changes. $3.4 million was
subsequently approved based on these analyses.
Background
Digital Equipment Corporation ("Digital") is a leading worldwide supplier of networked
computer systems, software, and services. Half of its revenues are derived from outside the
United States, developing and manufacturing products and providing customer services in
Europe and Asia. As of December, 1997, Digital employed approximately 55,000 people
worldwide with revenues in excess of $14 billion annually.
The Salem, New Hampshire facility is Digital's largest workstation and server assembly plant.
The plant is responsible for over $4 billion in annual revenue, both from sales of products
manufactured on-site and services provided at the factory. Depending on seasonal demand for its
products, the Salem plant employs between 1100 and 1600 people. Approximately 25 percent of
the workforce is comprised of temporary workers who are used to satisfy daily, weekly, and
quarterly surges in production requirements.
Digital's competitors for servers and workstations include Silicon Graphics, Hewlett-Packard,
Compaq, Sun Microsystems, IBM, and Dell Computer Corp. It is a fiercely competitive market,
and upstarts such as Dell are gaining market share by applying their lean, fast-paced
manufacturing capabilities learned from low-cost PC production to higher-performance server
and workstation manufacturing. For example, while Dell's server business contributed just 6%
toward 1996 revenues, its market share grew 300% in that year alone.1
Factory Layout
The Salem facility is split into four "cores" (Cores A through D) plus a warehouse attached by a
passageway. The plant has approximately 650,000 square feet:
* 130,000 square feet of administrative floor space (Core A);
* 120,000 square feet of floor space rented by Digital customers (or "tenants") (Core B);
* 250,000 square feet of manufacturing floor space (Cores C and D); and
* 150,000 square feet of warehouse floor space.
1McWilliams, Gary. Business Week. "Whirlwind on the Web." April 7, 1997.
A diagram of the facility is shown below:
Warehouse
Core C Core D
Data Center & J High Volume
Large Systems Manufacturing
Manufacturing J
Core A Core B
Office and Tenants
Administrative Area J
Note: Factory not drawn to scale
Products
The products assembled at the Salem facility fall into three "families": Desktop, Deskside, and
Data Center. As shown in the table below, the product name and the type of product further
differentiate the product families. The Desktop family has ten different products, Deskside has
six different products, and Data Center has five different products.
Desktop Miata Workstation
MX3 Workstation
Avanti Workstation
Maverick Workstation
Pelican Workstation
Sandpiper Workstation
Mustang Workstation
Chinet Server
Pmariah Client
Cougar Client
Deskside Rawhide Server
Mikasa/Noritake Server
Demi Sable Server
Sable Server
Alcor Workstation
Flamingo Workstation
Data Center Argon Server
Turbo Server
Rawhide Server
Neon Server
Crypton Server
Typically, servers are differentiated from workstations by the amount of storage capacity available
and the amount of memory used for operation (servers use more of both). Because workstations are
meant to support the work of one user at a time, they require only limited amounts of memory and
storage. All products can be custom-configured to customer preferences. Because of the number of
options, there are literally thousands of unique possible combinations of products.
In terms of size, Desktop products are roughly the same size as a personal computer. Accordingly,
Deskside products are the size of a large television, and Data Center products are about the size of
a refrigerator. All three product families use Digital's Alpha processor.
In addition to Deskside, Desktop, and Data Center products, the Salem facility assembles some
components that go into these products. The highest volume component, the Storage Building
Block (SBB), consists of a hard drive purchased from an external supplier and a special enclosure
that allows it to be plugged into a cabinet or shelf containing an array of SBBs.
Collectively, Desktop, Deskside, Data Center, and SBB products constitute Digital's System
Business unit (SBU) manufacturing organization. Desktop, Deskside, and SBB products are high
volume products. Data Center products, due to their complexity and cost, are lower volume
products.
Another manufacturing organization, the Computer Systems Solution (CSS) group produces highly
customized and very complex large systems and is co-located in Core C with the Data Center
manufacturing group. Together, the CSS group and the Data Center group constitute the Custom
Integrated Computing (CIC) manufacturing group.
Current Issues Facing Salem
As a cost center, the performance of the Salem facility is measured against three crucial metrics:
1. Total product cost - Total product costs affect profit margins and pricing strategies; thus, the
lower the total product cost, the better.
2. Order cycle time - At Digital, cycle time is defined as the total time it takes for the factory to
complete and ship an order from the time it receives the order. It is also common in industry to
refer to this metric as "order lead-time." Factors influencing cycle time include productivity
levels, manufacturing processes, availability of raw materials, and staffing levels. It is easier
for Digital to be competitive if it can meet or beat the relatively short order cycle times of its
competitors.
3. Predictability - Digital customers, especially those buying larger, more expensive systems,
place a high value on the predictability of an order delivery. Thus, it is crucial for Digital to
deliver its products on the agreed upon date and time since failure to do so can result in
secondary impacts for the customer. Complex system changes within companies are often
tightly scheduled around the planned arrival date of new Digital equipment.
There are four key issues facing the Salem facility that adversely affect the three crucial metrics
- (1) integration issues from manufacturing consolidation, (2) inadequate order predictability and
long order cycle time, (3) inefficient inventory control, and (4) quarterly production volume
skew. Each of these issues is discussed in more detail below.
Integration Issues from Manufacturing Consolidation
Over the past five years, a number of Digital manufacturing facilities have been closed and their
operations moved into the Salem facility. In 1994, the workstation and server assembly plant in
Albuquerque, New Mexico was shut down and all operations were transferred to the Salem
facility. In 1995 and 1996, workstation assembly lines in Ontario, Canada and large system
storage assembly lines in Colorado were also transferred to Salem. In all three cases, the transfers
took place over only a few months and limited time was available to incorporate these
manufacturing lines into Salem in an optimized fashion. As a result, the factory became packed
with a disarray of manufacturing equipment and people, and floor space has become a rare
commodity.
To complicate matters, the unique information system from each of the closed manufacturing
sites was transferred intact and made operational in the Salem facility. Consequently, there
currently exist several disparate and non-integrated information systems operating from a single
site, leading to inefficient material control.
Inadequate Order Predictability and Long Order Cycle Times
Digital's average cycle time (i.e., from customer order to final shipment) is currently between 13
and 15 days, although there exists a firm-wide goal to reduce cycle time to five days or less.
Meeting this goal, or at least decreasing the total order cycle time, would greatly improve
Digital's ability to accurately predict order completion and delivery dates. Shorter cycle time
reduces the chances of variables being introduced that could adversely affect production delivery
dates.
According to a recent market study by Kaiser Associates, Digital is near the bottom of the
competitive pool in terms of order cycle time and predictability. According to the study, Digital
managed to deliver its products on or before the promised delivery date only 73% of the time.2
The following table shows a comparison of average order cycle time (in days), as well as order
delivery predictability for Digital and five of its competitors.
Avg. Order Cycle
Company Product Family Time (days) Predictability
Digital Desktop 13 73%
Deskside 15 73%
Data Center 15 73%
Hewlett Packard Desktop 12* 92%
Deskside 12* 92%
Data Center 22* 88%
Sun Microsystems Desktop 10 82%
Deskside 10 82%
Data Center 18 80%
IBM Desktop 9 93%
Deskside 13 85%
Data Center 13 97%
Compaq Desktop 7 95%
Deskside 7 90%
Data Center 7 90%
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Desktop 13 70%
Deskside 30 80%
Data Center 30 80%
(Source: Kaiser Associates)
* Measured from customer order to customer receipt of order. All other cycle times are from customer order to
shipment of the order.
2 Kaiser Associates. "Competitive Analysis of Order Lead Time and Delivery Predictability." Study
presented to Digital Equipment Corporation, Maynard, MA. June, 1997.
Inefficient Inventory Control and Stock-Outs
The Salem facility has experienced significant and consistent problems with parts availability.
Parts shortages lead to delays in manufacturing of customer orders. A prior analysis found that
parts shortages were the primary reason Digital missed promised delivery dates.3
A number of possible reasons exist to explain the parts shortages. One reason may be poor
management of suppliers. Digital managers may not be receiving accurate forecasts for material
requirements, and thus, are unable to keep up with the demand for parts. Alternatively, suppliers
themselves may be late in shipping and are thus unable to meet the forecasts given to them by
Digital managers. A third reason may be that inventory is poorly controlled on the factory floor.
Digital managers have noted that parts are often not available even when the inventory system
claims they are. Conversely, parts are sometimes available when the inventory system claims
they are not. It is also possible that parts shortages occur due to a combination of the reasons
listed above.
Quarterly Production Volume Skew
Toward the end of each fiscal quarter, the volume of orders surges. There have been numerous
attempts to understand and correct this phenomenon, but no one analysis has conclusively shed
light on this problem. Management at Salem is focused on seeking ways to mitigate and/or
compensate for it. Typically, 50% of the quarter's orders occur in the last month of the quarter
causing a facility overload, which in turn results in an increase in orders arriving after their
promised date.
3 Hopkins, Pat. Thesis for SM and MBA. MIT Leaders for Manufacturing Program, 1997. Cambridge,
MA.
Objectives of the Reengineering Initiatives
To position Digital to meet world-class manufacturing standards, the Salem facility has set a
number of goals for FY'98:4
Inventory turns: An increase from 6.5 turns in FY'97 to 9.7 turns by 04, FY'98
By changing the way high-volume products are manufactured and the way inventory is stored on
the floor (see Appendix C for detailed information on the Salem Assembly Module - "SAM"),
Salem management hopes to become much more efficient in the use of inventory.
Predictability improvement: An increase from 73% in FY'97 to 95% by 04, FY'98
There are a number of proposed initiatives to improve the order consolidation and shipping
processes, described later in the document, that will reduce the total order cycle time and
improve order delivery predictability.
Total Manufacturing Costs: A 16% reduction
By pursuing both the SAM initiative and the order consolidation and shipping initiatives, the
Salem management hopes to reduce total manufacturing costs.
Shipment Complete: An increase from 12% to 60%
Currently, only 12% of the total orders are delivered from Salem directly to the customer. The
remainder must first move through Digital's Dascomb Road facility before being shipped to the
customer. This adds time and complexity to the order process. Shipping direct from Salem
would eliminate this complexity and improve order delivery predictability.
4 Annual Planning Report. Digital Equipment Corporation, Salem, NH. July, 1997.
Chapter 2 - Strategic Analysis of Functional Capabilities
Our approach to the Strategic Analysis consisted of three tasks:
* Interview members of the Steering Committee to better understand current processes and
potential new functional capabilities;
* Create a high-level process mapping of material flows (involving supplier, factory,
distribution center, and customer); and
* Assess the strategic implications of changing the functional capabilities of the Salem facility.
The team developed several criteria and associated questions to evaluate the potential new
functional capabilities:
Strategic fit:
Physical space and capacity:
Material flow intensity:
Does the proposed mix of manufacturing capabilities and
services fit with Salem's and Digital's vision of where they want
to be as a manufacturer and service provider?
Could the functional areas fit within the existing four walls of
the Salem facility and still have room for significant capacity
growth in the future?
How would the proposed configuration affect the flow of
material within the factory? Would it increase or decrease the
amount of material handling and congestion?
In this context, "changing the functional capabilities of the factory" is defined as the ability for
Salem to manufacture products it does not currently produce (e.g., PC's and circuit boards) or
furnish services it does not currently provide (e.g., order consolidation and shipping).
Finally, we attempted to understand the fundamental question of how to change the functional
capabilities of Salem such that order delivery predictability would improve and manufacturing
cost would decrease. To understand what functions should be grouped together, we looked at
expanding the Salem facility both vertically along the supply chain and horizontally across
product families.
Horizontal vs. Vertical Integration
This section highlights the key advantages and disadvantages of horizontal and vertical
integration of the Salem facility.
Vertical Integration - Possible Advantages
In her book, Modem Competitive Analysis, Sharon Oster states, "In considering vertical
integration, an organization should consider costs and benefits netted across units, reflecting
fully on opportunity costs."5 As such, as a first step the design team developed a list of potential
advantages if Salem were to become more vertically integrated:
* Lead time and cycle time reduction. By manufacturing more components on-site, Digital
would be able to eliminate the time required to move raw material to the factory from the
supplier. Time could also be saved by eliminating the trip finished goods take between the
factory and the order consolidation and distribution center.
* Lower manufacturing cost. Similarly, there would be an opportunity to save transportation
and transactional costs by eliminating a number of trips between raw material (component)
suppliers and Salem and between Salem and the customer. Additionally, becoming more
vertically integrated might allow Digital to eliminate the margins demanded by component
manufacturers, thus reducing cost.
* Reduced inventory. Inventory buffers between component sources and the Salem facility
used to prevent material shortages could be eliminated if some components were
manufactured on-site as needed.
* Improved feedback and quality control. Having some components manufactured on the same
site where the final products are assembled and tested would allow for rapid feedback to the
component manufacturing areas, should there be a quality problem with the components.
Component production could be stopped and the improvement process could begin
immediately.
* Improved predictability and better scheduling. It would become easier for management to
understand the actual length of time it needs to fill a particular order if there is visibility
across a larger portion of the supply chain. Problems in the supply chain are much more
5 Oster, Sharon M. Modem Competitive Analysis. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, New York.
1994. P.199.
readily apparent if they occur locally. Consequently, the process of predicting order
completion and delivery would be facilitated by local production of components.
* Increased amount of material shipped direct to the customer. As previously stated, one of
the goals set for the reengineering of Salem is to be able to ship a much greater percentage of
products directly to the customer from the Salem site. Performing order consolidation and
option fulfillment and shipping on-site would allow this to happen.
Vertical Integration - Possible Disadvantages
A number of potential draw backs also exist if Salem were to be more vertically integrated:
* Lack of local expertise. Should management attempt to produce some of the components on-
site, it might discover a lack of local expertise in the knowledge required to produce the
given component. This could cause a slower implementation process and initially could
create higher manufacturing costs until the necessary expertise is either brought in or
learned.
* Loss of economies of scale. By pulling some of the component manufacturing or product
consolidation and distribution business away from a facility that focuses solely on that
particular business, Digital may find itself with higher costs in both Salem and the other
functional areas since high fixed costs are now allocated across smaller product volumes in
each location.
* Opportunity cost of expanding more horizontally. By taking up space in the factory for
vertical integration, Salem would lose the opportunity to use that space for a horizontal
expansion of its existing businesses.
Vertical Integration - Potential Changes
Given these advantages and disadvantages, the team developed a list of possible functional
capabilities to make the facility more vertically integrated.
* Modules. The main circuit boards (modules) for all of Salem's deskside, desktop, and data
center units could be produced in Salem. Module manufacturing currently takes place in
Digital facilities in Singapore, Canada, and Scotland.
* Software Procurement. Software and documentation would be provided with all units
produced at Salem. Software is currently procured from the Nashua, NH facility.
* Order Consolidation and Shipping. Once a unit is assembled, it would be sent to the order
consolidation and shipping area to be placed with the other units of its order and then
shipped out to the customer. Order consolidation and shipping currently takes place at the
Dascomb Road facility in Andover, MA.
* Non-Embedded System Options Fulfillment. Optional components for a customer's order
that are not assembled into the final product (i.e., "non-embedded") would be added to the
order in the Salem facility. Currently, they are added to the shipment at the Dascomb Road
facility.
The following chart summarizes the potential benefits of these new vertically-integrated
functional capabilities at Salem:
Potential Benefits of Vertical Integration
Improvea improvea
Lead time and Lower feedback and predictability and
cycle time reduction manufacturing cost Reduced inventory quality control better scheduling
Upstream Integration:
Module Manufacturing
Downstream Integration:
Order Consolidation and
Shipping
Non-Embedded Options
Software Procurement
Horizontal Integration - Possible Advantages
As would be expected, the team then developed a list of the potential advantages if Salem were
horizontally integrated:
* Lower cost due to economies ofscale. By manufacturing similar products together on the
same site (e.g., workstations and PCs), the manufacturing cost per unit would decrease.
Fixed costs could be amortized over higher product volumes. Also, higher volumes of
similar products would facilitate better labor capacity and skill utilization, and training costs
would be minimized, given the similarities of tasks.
* Reduced inventory with common parts. Similar products can often share a number of
components, resulting in the need to stock proportionally fewer part numbers (e.g., PCs and
workstations would be able to share components such as the chassis, networking modules,
etc.)
Horizontal Integration - Possible Disadvantages
The potential disadvantages of horizontal integration at Salem are as follows:
* Reliance on external suppliers for goods and services. By focusing on a specific functional
capability, the Salem facility would become more reliant on external suppliers for some
necessary goods and services. This equates to less control and visibility of the supply chain,
which could adversely impact order delivery predictability.
* Opportunity cost of expanding more vertically. By taking up space in the factory for
horizontal integration, Salem would lose the opportunity to use that space for a vertical
expansion of its manufacturing capabilities.
Horizontal Integration - Potential Changes
The functional changes that would be made at Salem if horizontal integration were to be
implemented are as follows:
* Volume Operations. Besides adding more volume to the existing product lines in Salem, PC
manufacturing would share the same type of assembly operation as the high-volume products
in Salem, such as Desktop and Deskside workstations and servers.
Pick, Pack, and Ship Operations. There are a number of different functions that share the
same type of work. So-called "Pick, Pack, and Ship" operations involve picking a part or
product from storage, placing it into a shipping container either by itself or with other items,
and sending it to the shipping area. Software Procurement, order consolidation and shipping,
and non-embedded system options fulfillment all require this similar set of tasks and thus
would be candidates for horizontal expansion.
The following chart summarizes the potential benefits of each of the new functions:
Potential Benefits of Horizontal Integration
Lower unit cost due
to economies of Reduced inventory
scale with common parts
Volume Operations:
PC's
Pick, Pack, and Ship:
Order Consolidation and
Shipping
Non-Embedded Options
Software Procurement
From the above discussion on horizontal and vertical integration, it is clear that there are a
number of potential functional areas that could be added to Salem under both horizontal or
vertical integration. Thus, after considering the advantages and disadvantages of horizontal and
vertical integration, the team concluded that the final recommendation would most likely be
some combination of both types of integration.
To test this theory, the team selected a Data Center product, the type of product that best
represents most of the manufacturing processes that occur in Salem. In so doing, we compared
Salem's span of control over the total supply chain before and after integration (both vertical and
horizontal):
Before Integration - Areas Under Salem's Control:
Deskside
Rackmount
Data
Center
To make a Data Center product, Salem must first assemble a deskside unit in a "rackmount"
configuration, which is then placed into the Data Center cabinet. Salem also assembles the
shelves of disk drives that become part of a large storage array within the Data Center unit. In
this case, the modules that go into the deskside unit, the optional components that go both into
the deskside unit as well as the data center unit, the software that goes into the deskside unit, and
the order consolidation and shipping tasks, are all provided by facilities (either Digital or third
party) outside of Salem. If these tasks were performed on-site at Salem, management's span of
control over the supply chain would be as follows:
After Integration - Areas Under Salem's Control:
Modules IOptions Software
Deskside
Rackmount
Data Selvs I
Options Data -ShelvesCenter
Consolidation
& Shipping
The team concluded that bringing order consolidation, shipping, and the option fulfillment
business under Salem's control presented the best opportunity to assess the pros and cons of
integration. Not only were the tasks in these businesses similar enough to get economies of scale
(i.e., horizontal integration), they also allowed for a "downstream" vertical integration of the
Salem business. Bringing these businesses under Salem's control would allow the facility to
perform all of the above functions except for Modules and software.
As a result, more investigation into the order consolidation, shipping, and options fulfillment
business was required. The first step was understanding how the existing processes currently
function.
Consolidation, Shipping, and Options Fulfillment Process
As stated earlier, the main metrics used to judge the performance of the Salem facility are total
product cost, order cycle time, and order delivery predictability. A careful analysis of the current
order consolidation, shipping, and options fulfillment process based upon interviews with key
members of Salem management revealed a number of opportunities to improve upon all three
metrics. Under the existing process, material necessary to create a complete customer order
comes from three sources:
1. Third Party Suppliers: Suppliers sell hardware to be included as part of an order. For
example, a third party makes monitors, a Digital logo is placed on them, and they are sold
with many orders. Currently, the third party hardware is shipped to and stored in the
Dascomb Road facility and can be included in an order as an option.
2. The Nashua, New Hampshire facility: This Digital site provides software and documentation
for Salem orders. The software and documentation is sent directly to the In-Transit Merge
(ITM) facility, which is operated by a single, external shipping agent.
3. Salem: Salem assembles the hardware for all orders and most of the options that are not
purchased from a 3rd Party Supplier. The bulk of the system orders are sent to the Dascomb
Road facility where they are matched up with the appropriate options for the order. Once the
order is consolidated with the options, it is sent to the ITM site to be consolidated with the
software from Nashua. All of the data center orders are sent directly from Salem to the ITM
site, where they are consolidated with the software from Nashua and the options from
Dascomb Road.
The diagram below describes the material flow:
The Order Consolidation, Shipping and
Options Fulfillment Process, June '97
3rd Part Salem
m Nashua
Road
CUSTOMERS
The complexity of the existing system adds time and cost to the customer order process. Cost
and administrative expense are added by shipping system orders first to Dascomb Road and then
to ITM before finally being sent to the customer. Often, an order is delayed because part of an
order arriving from one of the three sources is missing or late. Consequently, the entire order is
held in the ITM area until the missing or late part is delivered.
Proposed Consolidation, Shipping, and Option Fulfillment Process
If Salem could eliminate the In-Transit Merge function and perform the options fulfillment
process in-house, the total order cycle time could be reduced by a number of days and a
significant amount of cost could be eliminated. Digital could save money by eliminating the
freight charges between Salem and Dascomb Road and by eliminating the In-Transit Merge
process. The shipping agent currently charges Digital and Digital's customers for the work it
performs to consolidate the orders. Thus, Digital could also save time by eliminating two of the
three shipping legs by having the shipping agent take material directly to the customer from
Salem.
The proposed changes would affect the order consolidation, shipping, and options fulfillment
process as follows:
The Proposed Order Consolidation, Shipping
and Options Fulfillment Process
CUSTOMEI
Under the proposed scenario, 3" party suppliers of hardware would deliver directly to Salem, and
all options for Salem products would now be stored on-site. The software and documentation
from Nashua would now be delivered directly to Salem as well. Salem would perform all order
consolidation, option fulfillment and shipping functions. Using a typical ordering process, the
existing customer order shipping process is as follows:
Existing Customer Order Shipping Process
Salem Dascomb Road In-Transit Merge Customer
Order Placed Ship Options Added Ship Ship
& Assembled to Order Order Consolidated Order Received
10 Days 1 Day---i] 1 Day 1] Day- 4-5 Days 1
17 -18 Days
(Note - The total order cycle time shown here includes the 4 to 5 days an order takes to reach the customer once it has
left Salem's shipping dock. In Chapter 3 of the thesis, Salem's average order cycle time is quoted as being 13 to 15
days. This measurement ends as soon as the product leaves Salem's shipping dock and does not include the actual
shipping time.)
After implementation of the proposed changes, a typical order would be as follows:
Proposed Order Shipping Process
Salem
Order Placed, Assembled,
Consolidated & Shipped
0 Days 1 4-5 Days
Ship
Customer
Order Received
14-15 Days
In short, two to three days would be eliminated from the order shipping process and costs could
be significantly reduced because of the simplification of the process. Thus, integration presents
an opportunity for Salem and Digital to save money and improve operational performance
through a combination of horizontal and vertical integration. As the above example illustrates,
the strongest candidates for integration are (1) the order consolidation and shipping business, and
(2) the system options fulfillment business.
In a June 1997 press release, Jeff McClees, a project manager at Hewlett-Packard captured the
essence of why Salem should consider integrating order consolidation, shipping and system
options fulfillment within its facility: "The push toward 'mass customization' in electronics
makes it imperative that manufacturers be fast and flexible in responding to customer orders. '"
By having the options business on-site, Salem would be better able to perform the "mass
customization" of its products in a more timely and cost-effective manner.
The next step in the analysis was to brainstorm on a number of different layouts for the Salem
facility to include the addition of the proposed functional capabilities described above.
6 Business Wire. "Hewlett-Packard Implements Global MES Solution from Industrial
Computer." June 16, 1997. Atlanta.
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Chapter 3 - Factory Layout Analysis
Given the potential new functional areas, the team developed a list of five possible layout
scenarios using a "greenfield" approach. The scenarios were then presented to the Steering
Committee. After subsequent discussion, the Committee made a recommendation to pursue one
scenario for further evaluation. The scenario selected was clearly the most feasible layout to
implement, met the necessary criteria, and was not prohibitive for cost or time reasons.
Additional analysis was thus performed to ensure that the design was indeed a good choice and
to offer any additional improvements to the selected scenario.
Greenfield Design
In the narrowest definition of the term, the factory layout analysis was not a true greenfield
exercise where there are no constraints on layout redesign. The team was constrained by having
to work within the confines of the existing building, and limited resources did not enable to team
to perform an analysis of the administrative work that occurred in Core A of the building. We
were, however, free to explore changing, moving, and adding to the functional capabilities of the
Salem facility within Cores B, C, D and the warehouse.
Each of the five greenfield layouts had to meet the following basic requirements:
1. All functional areas must be able to physically fit within the Salem facility;
2. The layout must offer space for expansion within Salem to meet growing demand for some
products; and
3. The layout must result in synergies between products and functional areas that would lead to
lower overall cost, lower cycle time, and improved predictability.
Using the list of potential functional changes for vertical and horizontal integration discussed in
Chapter 4, the team developed five possible layout scenarios summarized in the table below:
New Functional Areas
Order System Options PC's or Other Modules for Modules for Software for Software for
Consolidation Fulfillment High-Volume Salem and Other Salem Products Salem Products Salem and Other
Scenario and Shipping Products Products Only Only Products
Interviews were conducted with individuals at Salem who were expert in each of the new
functional areas. From these interviews, the team made their best estimates as to the necessary
floor space requirements and best placement within the facility.
For example, in Scenario 1 the team determined that the volume manufacturing cells (Salem
Assembly Module - SAM) would be expanded in capacity to produce the existing Desktops,
Desksides, and potential new, high-volume products, such as PC's. These cells would be placed
in both Cores A and C. The data center manufacturing area would be moved to Core B, and
order consolidation and shipping and options fulfillment would be placed in Core D. Finally,
software procurement would be placed in the warehouse and the module manufacturing capacity
would be expanded to produce modules for Salem and other products. Under this scenario, dock
doors would have to be added to Core D, and the tenants would have to be moved off-site.
A visual layout of Scenario 1 is shown below:
Scenario 1:
Core C Modules SAM Core D
System(DT/DS)i's 1Options
SAM (Other Volume)
Data Center
Core A Core B
WRR
Each scenario was diagrammed in a comparable manner. However, in comparison to the other
scenarios, Scenario 3 appeared to offer the most promise in meeting the Steering Committee's
priorities and consideration of time, money and feasibility in implementing a new factory layout
design.
Scenario 3 offered the following functional capabilities for Salem:
* Existing Salem businesses
* Modules for Salem products only
* Dascomb Road's order consolidation and shipping business, known as "Stock Room 183"
(SR183)
* Dascomb Road's systems options fulfillment business, known as "Stock Room 10" (SR10)
Scenario 3 enabled the team to place together functions that complemented each other, as well as
offering Salem the most flexibility in terms of space for additional manufacturing capacity.
Thus, the focus of the team's work was to complete further analysis to verify that Scenario 3 was
indeed the best option.
The visual layout for Scenario 3 is shown below:
Scenario 3:
Core C Modules e" DS/ Core D
Volume)
WRR Consol. &
Shipping
Core A Sys Core B
SOptions
A more detailed analysis of the material flow needed to be performed by the team to ensure that
the proposed layout would have a simple and logical flow of material through the facility to
minimize material movement. At the same time, the team sought additional ideas to improve
upon the selected design using a software package that helped analyze the thousands of material
moves that occur each day at Salem.
Material Flow Analysis
To perform an operational analysis of the selected layout scenario, the design team used a
software package called "Factory Flow." The software, created by the CIMTech Corporation of
Ames, Iowa, is a material flow analysis and diagramming tool for layout design, justification, and
presentation.
Factory Flow runs on top of AutoCADM and generates actual-path and point-to-point product
flow diagrams. The varying thickness of the flow lines that are drawn by the software represent
the amount of material being moved between two locations. Factory Flow also allows different
layout scenarios to be compared graphically and analytically, enabling the user to compare
scenarios on the basis of material flow intensity and overall material handling cost.
The Factory Flow model has eight stages to its design process:
1. Identify the goals of the study and determine the areas or products affected.
2. Determine the level of detail.
3. Adopt naming conventions for products, parts, material handling devices, and work-centers.
4. Gather and organize the input data.
5. Produce an AutoCAD plant drawing.
6. Integrate the drawing and the data.
7. Produce reports for analysis.
8. Analyze Reports and Make Recommendation
A more detailed description of the model and Steps 1 through 8 is included in the Appendix.
The following diagrams represent the differences in material flow under the existing (June 1997)
factory layout and under the recommended factory layout (Scenario 3). These diagrams are a
simplified version of the actual Factory Flow diagrams, which are included in Appendix A.
June, 1997 Layout:
Standard deliveries
To customers
As of June 1997, larger server manufacturing functions were split between the Data Center
manufacturing area (Core D) and the Computer Systems Solution (CSS) manufacturing area
(Core C). System Options were procured from the Dascomb Road facility, where the order
consolidation and shipping functions were also performed. The vast majority of the components
were received into the warehouse and then moved to the floor as necessary. Finally, a large
number of shipments were performed out of the warehouse and out of Core D, contributing to a
complicated flow, with material traveling in two directions through the same areas.
Dascomb Road
Recommended Layout:
Standard deliveries
POU deliveries POU deliveri In-Transit
Merge
Core A Core B
Admin. Options & 6 - shipments
Shipping direct to
In the recommended layout, the tenants would be moved out of Core B, and would be replaced
by the options fulfillment business (SR10) and the order consolidation and shipping business
(SR183). Options would be received through Core D dock doors. Enclosures would be
delivered to Salem near the Point of Use (POU) through Core C, and disks and shelves would be
delivered through Core D dock doors. To accommodate the increased load placed on the facility
by having consolidation and shipping in Core B, additional doors would need to be added next to
the existing doors in Core B (see the next chapter, "Factory Capacity Analysis"). No shipping
activity would be performed out of the warehouse or out of Core D, thereby simplifying the
material flows in those areas.
Based on the analysis completed using the Factory Flow model, the team verified that the
recommended layout (Scenario 3) would allow for a much simplified flow of material through
the facility as the initial layout analysis had indicated. Where there were large amounts of
material flow between two functional areas, the model showed that these areas would indeed be
in close proximity to each other. Likewise, the model determined that no areas existed where
material would be flowing both into and out of the facility. The resulting factory layout was thus
simplified and the flow of material more logical given the objectives and the established criteria.
Specifically, the team recommended that the following actions be taken at Salem to ensure a
superior flow of material:
1. All options should be received through the Core D dock doors.
2. High volume components, such as disks, shelves, and enclosures should be received into the
factory through the dock doors nearest their point of use.
3. All shipping activity should take place through Core B dock doors
In short, the expected net result of the factory layout changes is as follows:
* 20% reduction in the total annual number of feet material is moved between receiving and
assembly;
* 2-3 day reduction in the total order cycle time;
* Significant cost savings due to the elimination of some shipping activities (see Chapter 7,
"Financial Impact Analysis"); and
* Increased visibility of the total order manufacturing process and increased predictability of
order deliveries.
Because of the change in material flow into and out of the facility, the team's next task was to
determine precisely how much capacity the facility would need at its shipping and receiving
areas, i.e., how many dock doors would be needed under the new factory layout.
7 Because the recommended factory layout includes several new functions, such as order consolidation and
options fulfillment, these activities were not included in the comparison.
Chapter 4 - Factory Capacity Analysis
The primary purpose of the factory capacity analysis was to better understand how the proposed
functional changes would impact the flow of material into and out of the facility (versus within
the facility as discussed in the previous section). More specifically, the analysis sought to help
the team understand how much capacity would be required to eliminate or at least minimize the
chance of the shipping and receiving areas becoming bottlenecks. For both the inbound and
outbound models, fairly simple spreadsheets were created to calculate the number of required
doors. The main challenge in each model was to obtain accurate data and to establish reliable
assumptions.
Inbound model
The inbound capacity model was created to determine the required number of dock doors at the
warehouse for current and future manufacturing volumes.
Methodology
The model was based upon material receipt data from Q3 and Q4 FY'97, which covered the
periods of greatest activity for Salem in a fiscal year. The data collected consisted of the daily
total receipts for number of manifests, number of pieces, and number of pallets. "Pieces" are
defined as any item not included on a pallet. Typically, pieces are small boxes of components.
The model also used data collected from a time study of a number of receiving activities.
Finally, there were several assumptions made regarding the availability of dock doors, based on a
number of observations, and the effect of "Personal, Fatigue, and Delay" (PF&D). These are
described in the "Assumptions" section below.
The method used to calculate the number of doors breaks apart the receiving activity into its
component activities: bringing the truck to the door, unloading the pallets, unloading the boxes
(pieces), and pulling the truck away from the door.
The formulas used to calculate the required number of doors were as follows:
TotalDocklnutes#Doors = Roundupr ( i l o +1#oo= Roun (AvailableMnutes x Utilization)+1
(# Trucks x PullInPullOut+# Pieces x Time / Piece+# Skids x Time / Skid)
TotalDockMnutes = ManagementFactor
= #Manifests
#Trucks = 1.6
The "#Doors" calculation was rounded up to the nearest whole integer and then increased by
one. According to the receiving manager, one door must be dedicated to last-minute
"emergency" needs, such as FedEx and UPS deliveries of parts for orders that are short certain
components.
For the "#Trucks" calculation, a week's worth of receiving activity was sampled to determine
that, on average, there are 1.6 manifests per truck. Thus, the historical manifest data could be
used to determine how many trucks came to the receiving docks each day.
Assumptions
The team made the following assumptions and definitions in the model:
Pull-in, Pull-Out: This is the total time it takes a truck to pull up to a dock and away from a
dock, and includes all activity before the first piece is removed from the truck and after the last
piece is moved into the truck. The sampled average was 15 minutes.
Time/Piece: This is the time it takes to unload an item from the truck that is not on a pallet. The
sampled average was less than 1 minute.
Time/Skid: This is the time it takes to unload a pallet from a truck. The sampled average was
less than 3 minutes.
Management Factor: This factor accounts for breaks and for PF&D (personal, fatigue, and
delay). This factor was assumed to cause a 20% increase in required time to unload pallets and
pieces - thus, a management factor of 1.2.
Available Minutes/Day: The doors are available 2 shifts per day, eight hours per shift (960
minutes).
Dock Door Utilization: The factor is used to account for both simultaneous arrival of trucks and
the queuing that results, as well as the periods of inactivity at the door that follow because of
uneven loading at the doors. This figure is based upon an average of samples taken at the
warehouse dock doors and was estimated to be 60%.
Annual Revenue Growth: The assumption was made that revenue is proportional to the amount
of raw material moving into the factory, and thus, proportional to the dock door capacity
required. The projected growth rate is 15% for Salem.
Confidence intervals: Confidence intervals of 95% are used to calculate the number of doors
required. This means that twice the standard deviation is added to the average calculated dock
door requirement.8 This should be sufficient to cover any spikes in receiving and shipping
activity. The sampled data represents the period in Salem of highest annual activity, namely, the
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. Also, the model assumes only a five-day, two-shift
operation. Any spikes in activity in excess of the mean plus 2 times the standard deviation can be
accommodated by adding a shift or working on the weekend. There is also additional capacity
available by managing the shipping and receiving process more effectively so that the door
utilization increases and the management factor decreases.
Results
Before any final results could be calculated, there were a number of questions that needed to be
addressed (see Appendix B for a detailed description of the receiving volume analysis):
* Is there a significant skew to the volume of material being received by day, week, or month?
* If such a skew exists, how should we accommodate it?
* Are there types of shipments that are different enough from others (in terms of activities
performed and total time required) to nullify the assumption that all shipments, on average,
take about the same amount of time?
By looking at the receiving data broken down by type of shipping agent (large 18-wheel trucks
loaded with skids versus small trucks delivering packages of components), we were able to
determine the characteristics of the majority of receipts. We also analyzed the historical
variations in the number of receipts of trucks, skids, and pieces (boxes). We drew the following
conclusions:
8 Hogg, Robert V. and Johannes Ledolter. Applied Statistics for Engineers and Physical Scientists.
Macmillan Publishing Company. New York. 1992.
* The small truck receiving activity in the warehouse represents only about 10% of the total
trucking activity at the warehouse. 90% of the activity involves large 18-wheel trucks.
Thus, the model was based entirely upon the time characteristics of the larger trucks.
* During the first week of each fiscal quarter, there is a significant decrease in truck activity.
* With the exception of the lull at the beginning of each quarter, the daily volume of trucks
remains relatively constant. There is no skew for receiving activity.
* There is a spike in small packages received at the end of each quarter. This is due to the
factory expediting small parts to finish orders before the end of the quarter. However, the
volume of trucks remains relatively constant during this period.
* Adding one door to the total door requirement calculation and dedicating it to last-minute
"emergency" needs would help prevent bottlenecks from occurring due to the end-of-quarter
volume increase.
* The mean plus 2 times standard deviation upper limit should be sufficient for calculating the
required number of doors.
Thus, by using the mean plus 2 times standard deviation method and adding one to the total, the
inbound capacity model determined that the required number of dock doors for receiving in the
warehouse was six (6). Currently, there are six doors in the warehouse, so no doors needed to be
added. The details behind this analysis can be found in Appendix B.
Outbound model
The outbound capacity model was created to determine the required capacity of Core B for
current and future manufacturing volumes.
Methodology
Similar to the inbound model, the outbound model was based upon shipment data from Q3 and
Q4 FY'97. The data collected consisted of the weekly total number of high-volume (Deskside
and Desktop) system units shipped and lower-volume Data Center units shipped. From this data
and a number of assumptions (see next section), we calculated the total number of doors that
would be required using a comparable method as the inbound model: historical mean plus 2
times standard deviation, rounded up to the next whole number.
The formulas used to calculate the required number of doors for the outbound model are as
follows:
# Doors = Roundup:# Trucks x TruckTime x ManagementFactor
(AvailableMinutes x Utilization)
# Trucks (# VolUnits (# CICUnits
# Trucks = VolUnits / Palletx# Pallets / Truck) # CICUnits / Palletx # Pallets / Truck
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made for the outbound capacity model:
Number of Volume Products per Pallet: A pallet can a hold a maximum of 8 Desktops and 4
Desksides, but the typical customer order does not include the maximum number of these units.
From the data, we made an assumption was that on average, three units are loaded onto a pallet
before being shipped. This assumption enabled the team to calculate the equivalent number of
pallets required to satisfy the outbound flow of volume products (Desksides and Desktops).
Number of CIC Products per Pallet: The assumption made was that one CIC product maximum
can fit on a pallet, since these products are quite large.
Number of Pallets per Truck: A full 18-wheel truck can hold 20 pallets, and the assumption
made was that all trucks used for shipping are 18-wheel trucks and are completely filled before
leaving the shipping dock.
Average Truck Time at Door (min): Based on sampled data, a truck spends 50 minutes on
average at the shipping dock.
Available Minutes/Day: Same as inbound model: 960 minutes per day.
Management Factor: Same as inbound model: 20% buffer for personal, fatigue, and delay, or a
factor of 1.2
Door Utilization: Same as inbound model: 60% utilization.
Confidence interval: Same as inbound model: 95% equals the mean plus 2 times standard
deviation.
Results
Before any final results could be calculated, we had to answer the same issues of volume skew
that were addressed for the inbound model.
By plotting the historical shipping activity, our goal was to understand the nature of shipping
behavior and to verify that the method of using the mean plus 2 times standard deviation was
adequate and appropriate for calculating the required number of doors. (Please refer to Appendix
B for detailed information on the shipping volume analysis.)
There were a number of conclusions that were drawn from the historical shipping data:
* Having eight (8) doors total should be more than enough to handle even the periods of
highest volume.
* There is a significant upwards trend in shipment volume during the end of Q4 FY'97.
* The high-volume products represent 80% of the shipping activity, while the lower-volume
Data Center products represent only 20% of the shipping activity.
By using the mean plus 2 times standard deviation and then rounding this result up to the next
whole number, the analysis showed a total of eight (8) doors were necessary given the factory's
shipping requirements. There are currently three doors in Core B, so five doors would have to be
added.
Recommendations for Capacity Modeling
After creating the two capacity models, the team performed a "reality check" by presenting the
results to the shipping and receiving managers. They were comfortable with our results and had
previously independently recommended the same number of doors to the senior management of
Salem. Their recommendations were based on experience, not quantitative models, yet it was
reassuring to have another set of recommendations match the team's recommendations.
The analysis completed in the previous two sections was relatively simple, although enough
"buffers" were built into the models so that the recommendations were made using relatively
conservative assumptions, and call for perhaps more capacity than is immediately necessary.
The models also assume all processes are performed in the same manner in the future as they are
now. Thus, there are a number of opportunities to improve inbound and outbound capacity of the
plant without adding additional doors.
A summary of the capacity analysis recommendations is as follows:
* The warehouse (inbound) needs six (6) doors total; shipping (outbound) needs eight (8)
doors total.
* Salem should work with the shipping providers more closely and attempt to schedule the
arrival and departure of trucks so as to avoid any excess multiple arrivals, that result in
queuing and wasted time. This would significantly increase the door utilization.
* Material should be moved from the loading/unloading area directly in front of the dock doors
as quickly as possible. This would eliminate the problem of full trucks unable to deliver
their goods because of a lack of space on the floor in front of the dock door.
* Because the volume products constitute 80% of the shipping activity and because they are
much smaller than CIC products, there may be a better way to ship them than stacking them
on pallets and loading them into large trucks. Smaller trucks that spend less time at the doors
could take away smaller loads of boxes, eliminating the need to queue up enough material to
fill a truck before shipping. This would decrease the total order cycle time to the customer
and increase dock door utilization.
Chapter 5 - Financial Impact Analysis
As stated previously, the overall strategic and financial impacts on a factory-wide basis (versus a
project-specific basis) had not been evaluated for all the changes taking place currently at Salem.
This chapter describes each element in the reengineering of Salem and the total financial and
operational impact of these initiatives.
Most of the work in this chapter is the result of a collaboration with members of Salem's
Reengineering Steering Committee, which is composed of the factory's senior management, and
with several individuals from the factory's finance department. From this collaboration, the team
created a document known as a "Capital Appropriations Request" (CAR). The CAR was
presented to Digital in November 1997 to justify the capital requested to make the proposed
reengineering changes. The bulk of the CAR consisted of a financial and operational analysis of
five different iterations and a recommendation as to which iteration to pursue. Digital Corporate
approved the requested funds in late November.
Reengineering Initiatives
The purpose of the proposed reengineering changes is to allow Salem to be more vertically
integrated. Most importantly, the reengineering activities are expected to improve inventory
control and decrease total manufacturing and distribution costs.
The reengineering projects include the following:
Layout Changes:
* Move Tenants out of Salem
* Add five dock doors to Core B (for a total of eight doors)
* Consolidate of several small functions to Core A
Functional Capability Changes:
* Move Dascomb Road's order consolidation and shipping business (SR183) to Core B
* Move Dascomb Road's systems options fulfillment business (SR10) to Core B
Operational Changes
* Implement of the Salem Assembly Module (SAM) for all High-Volume Products
* Expand Module Capacity (Pending Digital Management Decision)
Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed description of each reengineering element. (Note - The
reengineering of Salem does not address any re-layout or reorganization of the administrative
areas in Core A.)
Benefits
The various reengineering initiatives would enable the Salem factory to realize a number of
benefits, namely:
* Total average order cycle time would be reduced to 14 - 15 days from 17 - 18 days.
* Salem would have a higher chance of achieving the goal of improving order delivery
predictability to 91%.
* Salem, under the Salem Assembly Module (SAM) initiative, would have more manufacturing
flexibility with manufacturing cells capable of rapid change-overs.
* With Core B cleared, Salem would have space available for expanding the manufacturing,
consolidation, and distribution businesses.
* Finally, there would be significant cost savings due to efficiencies gained in labor utilization,
reduction in inventory, and elimination of certain shipping activities.
A standard discounted cash-flow (Net Present Value) method was used to evaluate the financial
benefits of the reengineering initiatives.9 The NPV was calculated over five years with a discount
rate of 20%. From Salem's perspective, the NPV was calculated only to show how the
investments would affect the internal financial performance of the facility. The NPV calculation
is of most value to Digital, where the costs and savings to the corporation. The primary
difference between the Salem NPV calculation and the Digital calculation is the loss from
Salem's P&L of the tenant rent (for the use of Core B). Digital as a whole would not lose the
tenants' rent, as tenants would move to another Digital facility.
9 Higgins, Robert C. Analysis for Financial Management. Irwin, Inc. New York. 1995.
When the costs and savings of the reengineering projects are calculated, the financial return to
Digital was determined to be:
* Net Present Value (NPV) to Digital: $8.OM
* NPV to Salem: $3.3M
* Pay-back period: 14 months
Risks
If the integrated reengineering program were denied, Salem would be incapable of completing
the SAM implementation. There would not be sufficient floor space in which to place the final
SAM cell. In addition, there would be no room to bring the System Options business from
Dascomb Road to Salem, so Salem would be unable to ship complete orders directly to the
customer. As a result, nearly all orders would continue to go through In-Transit Merge and
Dascomb Road before reaching the customer. Finally, Salem would continue to suffer from
bottlenecks in the shipping/receiving areas during periods of high activity due to inefficient
material flows within the factory. Thus, while Salem may be able to make incremental
improvements in performance without making significant changes to its infrastructure, only the
successful completion of the reengineering initiative allows Salem to be able to make great gains
in performance.
Alternatives
A financial impact analysis of five iterations of the recommended reengineering plan was
performed as part of the Capital Appropriations Request. The analysis also assessed the
sensitivity of the financial impact of not completing some of the planned changes. (For example,
what if the facility to which the tenants were scheduled to move were suddenly unavailable and
there was no place else to move the tenants?)
Thus, the iterative analysis consisted of analyzing the impact of the following different actions:
Move the tenants off-site: This is the planned course of action.
Compress tenants in Core B: If the tenants could not be moved, their current layout could be
changed so that they use less space, freeing up space to be used for other functions.
Add an addition to the Salem building: This would provide additional space for new functions,
should the tenants not be able to move.
Do nothing: This iteration accounts for a situation where the tenants are unable to move and
unable to compress their floor space, and Salem does not receive the money to construct an
addition to the existing factory.
There are four different results, with corresponding NPV's for Digital and for Salem:
Shipping in Salem: Even if nothing else changes, Salem would still be able to have the shipping
function on-site.
Options in Salem: This is the planned course of action.
Complete SAM implementation: The first four iterations in the financial impact analysis allow
for a complete SAM implementation.
Partial SAM implementation: This only occurs under iteration 5 (the "do nothing" iteration),
where there is not enough space available to finish implementing all the SAM manufacturing
cells.
A description of each iteration, including its advantages and disadvantages, can be found below.
See Appendix C for a financial summary and analysis of each iteration.
Action I I Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New .. Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
2 x x x x x $5.2 $4.5
3 x x x $8.3 $7.2
4 x x x x $3.5 $3.6
5 x x $7.1 $6.9
Iteration 1:
Action Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New I Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
1 x x x x $8.0 $3.3
This is the iteration Salem management has selected to pursue. Iteration 1 not only has the
second highest Net Present Value for Digital, but from an operational perspective, it also best
aligns Digital's manufacturing strategy with Salem's capabilities. This iteration allows Salem to
ship 60-70% of its orders direct to the customer to reduce total order cycle time, and total cost,
and improve order predictability. It also allows a complete implementation of the SAM cells
across all high-volume products. Finally, this iteration positions Salem for significant growth in
the future with room to accommodate more SAM manufacturing cells and the possibly of
manufacturing modules for all Salem products.
Iteration 2:
Action Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New I Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
2 x x x x x $5.2 $4.5
Iteration 2 would add an addition to the main building and move a large portion of administrative
activities into the new building. The tenants' footprint would be reduced in Core B, and shipping
and options would be placed in Cores A & B. While iteration 2 offers nearly all the benefits of
iteration 1, the return to Digital is also not as large due to the costs of the new building
construction.
Iteration 3:
Action Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New _ Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
3 x x x $8.3 $7.2
While iteration 3 has the most favorable Net Present Value both to Digital and to Salem, it does
not allow for any significant expansion in manufacturing capacity. This is a large opportunity
cost not reflected in the Net Present Value. This iteration also does not allow Salem to ship
directly to its customers because the Systems Options business would remain at Dascomb Road.
Iteration 4:
Action Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
4 x x x x $3.5 $3.6
In iteration 4, the tenants would be moved to a new building addition at the main Salem facility,
and the shipping and options business would be moved to Core B. Like iteration 2, iteration 4 is
more expensive than iteration 1 and offers no additional benefits.
Iteration 5:
Action Result
Financial Move Compress NPV, NPV,
Impact Tenants off tenants in New Shipping in Options in Complete Partial Digital Salem
Iteration site Core B Building Salem Salem SAM SAM ($millions) ($millions)
5 x x $7.1 $6.9
Iteration 5 is essentially the "do nothing" option. If the tenants remain in Core B and shipping
remains where it is currently (temporarily placed in Core D), the SAM implementation would be
incomplete, since the addition of the SAM shelves cell would be impossible. It also does not
position Salem for any growth, and because the systems options business remains at Dascomb
Road, Salem cannot ship directly to its customers.
Recommendation from Financial Analysis
The main criteria in evaluating whether or not the current reengineering initiatives at Salem are
financially and operationally beneficial is if Salem is able to meet the performance goals set for
FY'98, which are as follows:
* Inventory turns: increase from 5.4 to 7.5
* Predictability improvement: increase from 70% to 91%
* Manufacturing Costs: 16% reduction
* Ship directly to the customer: increase from 12% to 60% of all orders
Other important success factors include:
* Timely implementation of changes
* Staying within projected costs
Because Iteration 1 allows Salem to ship 60-70% of its orders directly to its customers, allows
for a complete implementation of all SAM cells, creates enough factory space for Salem to be
positioned for future growth, and realizes a high NPV, it was determined that this iteration was
the best strategy to pursue.
Chapter 6 - Conclusion
In their article entitled, "When and When not to Vertically Integrate," Stuckey and White explore
the issues behind vertical integration decisions.o The authors present four reasons for vertical
integration:
1. The existence of a risky and unreliable market;
2. As a defense against market power;
3. To create and exploit market power; and
4. As a response to industry life cycle dynamics.
While the recommendations in this thesis do not require Digital Equipment Corporation to
become more vertically integrated, they do suggest a consolidation of activities into the Salem
facility, such that within Digital, the Salem facility becomes more vertically integrated. Using
Stuckey and White's reasoning for vertical integration, one could make strong arguments in
defense of vertical integration for the Salem facility:
* The workstation and server markets have proven to be risky and unreliable; demand can
surge during the last quarter of a fiscal year and plummet during the first quarter of the next
year. Having increased visibility and control over the supply chain will allow Salem to
respond more quickly, accurately, and efficiently to swings in demand.
* By pulling new functions into the Salem facility, the business will be better able to defend
and exploit market power through reduced costs and cycle time as well as improved order
delivery predictability.
* Finally, because the life cycle of workstation and server products is relatively short (often
less than 18 months), having more of the shipping and options business on-site will ensure a
minimum level of inventory is kept on-hand. This change will help Salem avoid having to
write-off excess amounts of obsolete inventory when new products replace old ones.
10 Stuckey, John and David White. "When and When Not to Vertically Integrate." Sloan Management
Review, Vol. 34 No. 3, Spring 1993: 71-83.
In conclusion, the following recommendations are made to improve the financial and operational
performance of the Salem facility:
* Place the option fulfillment, order consolidation, and shipping functions in Core B.
This would allow for superior material flows through the facility, as well as a reduction in
total order fulfillment cost, order lead-time, and an increase in order delivery predictability.
* Move the tenants to another Digital facility. This would provide adequate space for the
newly transferred functions in Salem.
* Add five dock doors next to the existing three doors in Core B. To perform all shipping
activity out of Core B, a total of eight dock doors will be necessary to meet current and
future capacity requirements. No additional dock door capacity will be required for the
receiving function in the warehouse area.
* Use the dock doors nearest to the assembly activity for receipt of high volume
components. The amount of material handling can be reduced by 20% by bringing some
high-volume items to the floor using the dock doors nearest to the assembly activity.
* Receive all options through Core D dock doors. Material flow would be minimize by
using doors in Core D near the System Options Fulfillment area. Receiving material through
Core B doors is not recommended.
* Use Core B dock doors for all shipping activity. Again, this would allow for superior
material flows out of the facility.
In addition, there are a number of tasks that were outside the scope of this thesis, but should be
pursued to continue improving the operational performance of the Salem facility:
* Perform a detailed evaluation of the costs and benefits of manufacturing circuit boards
on-site. By becoming more vertically integrated by manufacturing modules (circuit boards)
for all Salem products on-site, a number potentially large benefits exist, but such an
evaluation was beyond the scope of this thesis.
* Work with the shipping providers to schedule the arrival and departure of trucks. A
schedule for trucks would help avoid any excess multiple arrivals, which result in queuing
and wasted time and would significantly increase the door utilization.
Investigate using smaller trucks more frequently in the shipping area. Because the high-
volume products constitute 80% of the shipping activity and because they are much smaller
than the Data Center products, there may be a better way to ship high-volume products than
stacking them on pallets and loading them into large trucks. Smaller trucks that spend less
time at the doors could take away smaller loads of boxes, eliminating the need to queue up
enough material to fill a truck before shipment. Such a change would decrease the total
order cycle time to the customer and increase dock door utilization.
Appendix A - Description of CIMTech Material Flow Analysis
There were eight stages in the material flow analysis of the Factory Flow model:"
1. Identify the goals of the study and determine the areas or products affected.
2. Determine the level of detail.
3. Adopt naming conventions for products, parts, material handling devices, and work-centers .
4. Gather and organize the input data.
5. Produce an AutoCAD plant drawing.
6. Integrate the drawing and the data.
7. Produce reports for analysis.
8. Analyze Reports and Make Recommendation
Goals of the Analysis
The goal of the design team was to use Factory Flow to ensure that the recommended layout was
a superior way to layout the new functional capabilities at Salem. If any serious problems or
issues with the recommended layout arose, the design team would have focused on finding an
alternative solution.
Level of Detail
Because of time constraints, the team focused only on the location of the major functional
"blocks" within the factory. For the existing factory, these blocks included:
* Salem Assembly Modules (SAM), of which there are two components:
* Desktop parts kitting and assembly areas
* Deskside parts kitting and assembly areas
* Data Center assembly area
" CIMTech Corporation. "Factory Flow Software Handbook." Ames, IA. 1995.
* Warehouse
* Order consolidation and shipping area
* System Option Fulfillment area.
The team did not study equipment layout within each of these major manufacturing blocks
because of the detailed nature of such an analysis.
In addition, because of the large number of products and options available, the team decided to
take a sample of products that were a fair representation of all products that flow through the
factory. The volumes of these sample products would be inflated in the model to approximate
the total volume of material that moves through the factory.
Naming Conventions
For the final products, the following abbreviations were used:
* Deskside: DS
* Desktop: DT
* Storage Building Block: SBB
* Rack Mount: RM
* Custom Integrated Computing: CIC
The functional blocks within the factory were named as follows:
* Warehouse dock doors: WHDOCK
* Core B dock doors: BDOCK
* Core C dock doors: CDOCK
* Core D dock doors: DDOCK
* Desktop kitting area: DTK
* Desktop assembly area: DTA
* Deskside kitting area: DSK
* Deskside assembly area: DSA
* CIC assembly area: CIC
Input Data
This phase of the CIMTech flow simulation proved to be one of the most challenging. Because
of the large number of products assembled in the factory and the large number of options for
each product, there was a vast quantity of data that had to be collected and sorted before any
meaningful information could be produced.
The primary method of analysis was to follow a part's flow through the factory, recording total
distance and time:
From
Workcenter
To
Part Workcenter
Part
The flow data entered into Factory Flow determines what paths will be drawn and analyzed.
There were three data files required for the flow analysis:
Material HandlingProducts File Parts File
Equipment File
Product name and production Part name, quantity of the part Fixed and variable costs,
quantity per time unit in each finished product unit, speed, and effectiveness of the
from where and to the part is material handling equipment
moved, the device named used device named in parts file
to move the part, and how
many parts are moved at a
time
Products File
As stated above, the team's first major assumption was that a selected cross-section of products
could be used in the material flow analysis to approximate the flow of all material through the
factory. The products chosen either constituted the majority of the material flow within a certain
functional block and/or represented nearly all of the operations that occurred within a given
functional area. The team then inflated each product's annual volume to approximate the planned
annual volume of all of that family's products. For example, for the Deskside manufacturing
area, we chose the "Rawhide" family of products. The Rawhide family of products are the
highest volume Deskside product in the Salem facility. They also use the most commonly
required options for Deskside products. Thus, the majority of different options and product
flows within the Deskside family were captured by approximating all Deskside flows with the
Rawhide family of products.
The planned capacity for the Rawhide family is about 20,000 units per year, but the planned
capacity for all Deskside products is 48,000 units per year. Thus, in the model, we used a
planned capacity of 48,000 Rawhide units per year to approximate the flow of all Deskside units
through the factory.
The representative products selected were as follows:
Desktop Deskside CIC Disks Rackmount Options
Miata • Rawhide Turbo Generic SBB* Generic Generic
Rackmount* Option*
MX3
* Because of the simplicity of operations of these products, each one could be represented by a
generic product flow. There are so few deviations from the normal flow that compiling the
routings for an actual product and all its (infrequent) options would not significantly affect
the material flow intensities through the various functional areas.
An example of the Factory Flow input screen for the products file is as follows:
(Juantity
Product Name per Year Line Color
RAWHIDE 48,000 1
SHELVES 80,000 2
TURBO 10,000 3
MIATA 80,000 4
RACKMOUNT 2,000 5
DISKS 600,000 6
MX3 20,000 7
SBUSR_10 23,200 8
Parts File
The team's second major assumption of the material flow analysis was that for each product
family, specific components can be generically categorized under a single part class. For
example, for the routings, we merely used the first two characters from the part number to
identify the class of parts to which a particular component belongs.
For example, part #99-5473902-01 is a cardboard box used to package desktop units. Using our
assumption, this part simply becomes "99" (packaging material). This was done to simplify the
analysis; most parts of the same class have similar characteristics as far as size and quantity per
move. By describing all parts of the same class as having the same physical attributes and move
quantities, we eliminated the need to describe the attributes of every single part. This was
fortunate, as there are literally thousands of parts specified as components in each of the product
families.
The parts file requires the routing ("from" and "to") for each component of a product, its "pallet
density" (the number of the parts transported in a single move), and the method used to move the
part. The following shows the set of assumptions used to describe all of the material flows that
occur for the assembly of Storage Building Blocks, or "SBB's." For each class of parts, it
documents the route it follows through the factory, what types of material handling equipment
are used and how many parts are moved at a time.
Product Family: SBB
Mat. Hand. Pallet Mat. Hand. Pallet Mat. Hand. Pallet
Class From Method Density To Method Density To Method Density To
36 WHDOCK WRIDE 10000 218A WRIDE 10000 218B WRIDE 10000 SBB
99 DDOCK WRIDE 250 SBB
70 WHDOCK WRIDE 180 218A WRIDE 180 218B WRIDE 180 SBB
17 WHDOCK WRIDE 720 218A WRIDE 720 218B WRIDE 720 SBB
90 DDOCK WRIDE 10000 SBB
74 WHDOCK WRIDE 560 218A WRIDE 560 218B WRIDE 560 SBB
DEFAULT WHDOCK WRIDE 200 218A WRIDE 200 218B WRIDE 200 SBB
SBB SBB WRIDE 110 183 WRIDE 110 DDOCK
For example, the first five blocks of the first row describe the following material flow:
From 10000 To
Warehouse Dock - class - Kitting Area
"WHDOCK" 36 "218A"
Material Handling File
The third file necessary for the model documents the necessary cost and performance
characteristics of each type of material handling equipment. In the Salem facility, material is
moved primarily by two types of equipment: "walkie-riders," which are motorized pallet jacks
upon which operators may stand and ride; and manual pallet jacks, which are pushed or pulled by
the operators.
For each material device, the material handling file documents its replacement cost, its hourly
fuel, parts, and maintenance costs, the hourly labor costs, the available minutes per year, the load
and unload time, the travel speed of the device, the number of devices on-site, and the efficiency
of the device. The efficiency of a device shows how often, on average, the device is actually
moving material, versus moving without carrying any material. For example, if a hand truck is
used to carry a load of boxes from site A to site B and then returns empty to site A for another
load, the hand truck is described as being 50% efficient.
An example of the Material Handling file is as follows:
Laptal Houny -Fuel, I ravel
Material Material Device Replacement Parts, & Maint. Hourly Minutes Load/Unload Speed Number
Handler Name Type Cost Costs Labor Cost Available/Yr. Time (min) (ft/min) on-site Efficiency
WRIDE LIFT_TRUCK $3,000 $1.00 $15.00 230,400 1 250 15 70%
HANDT HAND_TRUCK $100 $15.00 230,400 1 50 21 50%
CONV CONVEYOR $25,000 $5.00 $0.00 230,400 - 0 1
CART HAND TRUCK $100 $15.00 230,400 1 50 12 50%
AutoCAD Plant Drawing
Once all three Factory Flow files were created, the team created an AutoCAD drawing of the
original (existing) and proposed factory layouts and defined all of the functional areas and aisles
for material movement throughout the factory.
Integration of Drawing and Data
The team then ran the Factory Flow software for the original factory and the proposed layout.
There were several results the team sought to ensure that the recommended layout was
appropriate:
* The widest lines (those lines that represented the greatest amount of material flow intensity)
should be short. Wide and long lines are indicative of a sub-optimal layout, as a significant
amount of material must move a long distance through the facility, adding time and expense
to the material flow process.
* The material flow through the facility should be as simple as possible, and as often as
possible, flows should move in one direction along any given path.
The results were as follows:
Existing Layout
FECewV
JUNE 1997
CORE
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D
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B
Proposed Layout
Cc:
A
Moe
D
C-
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Interpretations:
There was little difference in the Core D material flows between the "Existing Layout" and
the "Proposed Layout." The main difference was the moving of shipping activity from the
Core D dock doors to the Core B dock doors in the proposed layout. In both cases, a
significant amount of material is received in the Core D dock doors.
* The Order Consolidation and Systems Options Fulfillment businesses were moved to Core B
from Dascomb Road (external facility) under the proposed layout scenario. There was a high
flow of material in this area (note the very wide lines in Core B), but since all shipping
activity takes place through the Core B dock doors, these lines are short.
* There is a long, fairly wide line from the warehouse to Core B because of the number of
options received at the warehouse and moved directly to Core B. This line could be
alleviated by receiving all options through the Core D dock doors.
* There is also a fairly wide and long line from the warehouse to the top of Core D. This line
could be reduced by receiving a number of high-volume components, such as disks and
shelves, through the Core D dock doors, which are closer to their point of use.
* It is nearly impossible to tell which direction material is flowing from these diagrams, so the
team created two more diagrams that qualitatively illustrate the difference between the
existing layout and the proposed layout. These diagrams are included in the main text of the
document (Chapter 5).
Reports for Analysis
The team then created a spreadsheet to analyze the difference in material flow between the
existing, June 1997 layout and the proposed layout. In order to make a fair comparison between
the two layouts, we compared only the distances products travel between their arrival into the
factory and up to and including their assembly. All travel within the factory after assembly is
ignored. In the June 1997 layout, the material would have left the facility at this point, while in
the proposed layout, the material would have gone on to Core B for consolidation with options
and ultimately, for shipping.
An example of the data used in our analysis is as follows:
Product name: TURBO
Distance
Between WHDOCK and 218A 1,068,117
Between 218A and CIC 3,775,546
Between DDOCK and CIC 11,069,650
Between CIC and WHDOCK 10,386,585
Total 26,299,898
The above report tracks the total annual distance parts travel between various locations on the
factory floor for a particular family of products. The reports for the June 1997 layout are then
compared to the proposed layout. The analysis revealed that by delivering enclosures through
Core C doors and disks and shelves through Core D doors, the annual material flow intensity in
the factory could be reduced by 20%.
Analysis of Reports & Recommendation
The team's assessment was that the recommended layout would allow for a superior flow of
material through the facility, assuming the following actions were taken:
1. All options should be received through the Core D dock doors.
2. High volume components, such as disks, shelves, and enclosures should be received in to the
factory through the dock doors nearest their point of use.
3. All shipping activity should take place through Core B dock doors.
Appendix B - Inbound and Outbound Capacity Analysis
Inbound Model - Receiving Volume Analysis
By looking at the shipping data segmented by different types of carriers, the team hoped to
understand how much of the receiving activity involved large 18-wheel trucks loaded with pallets
versus smaller delivery vans loaded with only boxes. If there were a significant volume of
smaller truck activity, then the selected model would have to be reevaluated since the model is
based on the assumption that most of the activity in the warehouse involves 18-wheel trucks.
Typically, 18-wheel trucks spend more time at the receiving docks than do the smaller trucks
carrying only boxes.
There were four different types of carriers segmented in the data: Common Carriers, Ryder, Air
Carriers, and UPS. Common Carriers and Ryder were similar because both consistently used
large trucks loaded with both pallets and pieces. Air Carriers and UPS were similar because both
consistently used smaller trucks and carried only packages.
For each type of carrier, the team plotted the number of manifests (directly related to the number
of trucks), the number of pieces, and the number of pallets received per week. For each plot, we
added the y-axis error bar of the mean plus 2 times standard deviation. Any plot with a point
above this error bar could be cause for further scrutiny. The shipping histories for Q3 and Q4
FY'97 were as follows:
Common Carriers - Receiving Activity per Week, Q3 & Q4, FY'97
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There were several conclusions that can be drawn from these graphs:
* Ryder and Common Carrier have a combined average of 184 manifests/week. UPS and Air
Carriers have a combined average of 22 manifests per week. Thus, the small truck receiving
activity in the warehouse represents only about 10% of the total trucking activity at the
warehouse. The team concluded its assumption - that all trucking activity in the warehouse
area had the characteristics of the large, 18-wheel trucks - was valid.
* During the first week of each fiscal quarter (weeks 26 and 39), there was a significant
decrease in activity.
* The number of pallets Ryder delivers per week has an upward trend through the quarter,
while there does not seem to be any trend on the number of pieces delivered. However, at no
point during this sampled time period does any of the Ryder activities exceed the mean plus
2 times standard deviation limit.
* The number of pieces the Common Carriers deliver per week has an upward trend through
the quarter, although there did not seem to be any trend as to the number of pallets delivered.
There is one point in Q4 where the number of pieces delivered exceeds the mean plus 2 times
standard deviation limit.
* There is a significant spike in activity for UPS during the end of Q4, and for two weeks, the
receiving activity exceeds the mean plus 2 times standard deviation limit. This is due to the
factory expediting small parts to fulfill orders before the end of the quarter.
* There is one point during the end of Q3 that receiving activity for the Air Carriers exceeds
the mean plus 2 times standard deviation limit.
* By adding one door to the total door requirement calculation and dedicating it for last-minute
"emergency" needs, such as FedEx (an air carrier) and UPS, bottlenecks could be prevented
from occurring when the end-of-quarter volume increase occurs.
The next issue that needed to be addressed was the receiving volume skew by week. Do any of
the trends noted above by carrier actually affect the total receiving volume? Or is one carrier's
increase offset by another's decrease? To answer these questions, the team plotted each week's
average number of manifests, pallets, and pieces delivered per day. Again, the team added the
mean plus 2 times standard deviation y-axis error bars to each graph. The results are shown
below:
Average Number of Manifests per Day, by Week, Q3 & Q4, FY97
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Average Number of Pieces per Day, by Week, Q3 & Q4, FY97
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The team drew the following conclusions from the above graphs:
* Because the number of manifests is directly proportional to the number of trucks received
each day, it can be assumed that the daily volume of trucks remains relatively constant.
* There is one point in the average number of pieces received per day that exceeds the mean
plus 2 times standard deviation upper limit. This occurrence reinforced the recommendation
that one door be added to the total door requirement to accommodate last-minute deliveries
of small packages.
* The mean plus 2 times standard deviation upper limit should be sufficient for calculating the
required number of doors.
Thus, by using the mean plus 2 times standard deviation method and adding one to the total, the
required number of dock doors for receiving in the warehouse came to six (6).
A sample of the data and the assumption input area of the model is shown below:
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Sampled Analysis - by day of week and by week
Week
27
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
52
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
3349.4 31364 26022
Mean 34.4 21.5 239.5 166.8 1274.4 2.2
Median 39.0 24.4 258.0 180.5 1433.6 2.5
Std Dev. 15.5 9.7 128.8 92.7 610.2 1.1
Maximum 68.0 42.5 787.0 390.0 2622.9 4.6
SaWmed Data
Available Annual
A ssumptions on Pull-in, Time/Piece Time/Pallet Management Minutes/Day Dock Door Revenue
Pull-Out (min.) (min.) Factor per Door Untilization Growth
13 1.2 60 1 60% 16
Outbound Model - Shipping Volume Analysis
By plotting the historical shipping activity (shown below), the team sought to understand the
nature of shipping behavior and to verify that using the mean plus 2 times standard deviation was
an adequate method for calculating the required number of doors.
Number of Number of Number ot Number ot TOtal Dock Required V
Manifests Trucks Pieces Pallets Minutes Doors
23 14.4 156 49 622 1.1
19 11.9 130 46 535 0.9
0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0
32 20.0 260 138 1169 2.0
37 23.1 261 195 1431 2.5
7 4.4 39 4 140 0.2
50 31.3 288 278 1909 3.3
40 25.0 271 187 1448 2.5
48 30.0 353 304 2058 3.6
46 28.8 258 262 1770 3.1
38 23.8 294 139 1281 2.2
10 6.3 98 19 299 0.5
Manifests per Truck Manifests Trucks
Sampled Data 92 - /5
Tues 35 25
Wed 35 23
Thurs 40 22
Fri 34 20
Total 144 90
Manifests per Truck 1.6
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There were a number of conclusions that can be drawn from these graphs:
* Having a total of eight (8) doors should be more than enough to handle even the periods of
highest volume. The mean plus 2 times standard deviation and then rounding the result up to
the next whole number resulted in a total of eight (8) doors necessary for shipping
requirements.
* There was a significant upwards trend in shipment volume during the end of Q4 FY'97.
* The high-volume products represented 80% of the shipping activity, while the lower-volume
CIC products represented only 20% of the shipping activity.
A sample of the data and the assumption input area of the model is shown below:
_ _____ ___I_
Assumptions
Number ot Volume Products per Pallet Available Minutes/Day
3 960
Number of CIC Products per Pallet Management Factor
1 1.2
Number ot Pallets per I ruck Door Utilization
20 60%
Average Truck I me at Door (min)
50
VOL Products (DT/DS)
Total Weekly Volumes
Gust.
121
874
1097
1051
1325
1936
Intl.
111
137
254
287
241
206
Inter.
297
923
983
604
563
593
Intra. ZBA "s
9 18
201 51
259 32
615
643
379
lotal
556
2186
2625
2558
2787
3134
S#Trucks
9.3
36.4
43.8
42.6
46.5
52.2
#Doors
1.0
3.8
4.6
4.0 mean
0.84 std dev
Data Center Products
Total Weekly Volumes
Week Gust. Intl. Inter. Intra. D. M. Total #Trucks #Doors
27 115 44 66 0 0 225 3.8 0.4
28 262 51 93 5 0 411 6.9 0.7
29 275 75 117 10 134 611 10.2 1.1
50 267 56 101 18 124 566 9.4 1.0
51 391 122 149 39 121 822 13.7 1.4
52 697 63 115 46 126 1047 17.5 1.8
Grand Total
Grand
Total
781
2597
3236
3124
3609
4181
#Doors
1.4
4.5
5.6
5.4
6.3
7.3
1.0 mean
0.26 std dev
week
27
28
29
50
51
52
Week
27
28
29
50
51
52
5.0 mean
1.0 std dev
ITtal Number of Doors Required
8.0 roundup(mean + 2*std dev)
Appendix C - Description of Reengineering Elements
Following is a summary of the operational advantages, customer advantages, financial
implications, and assumptions of each element in the reengineering of the Salem facility:
Move Tenants out of Salem
* Operational Advantage: More space available for manufacturing, consolidation, and
distribution
* Financial Implications:
* Dependencies:
Capital: Computer Network installation $330K
Capital: Fit-up alt. site for displaced tenants $1,200K
Expense: De-fit Core B $557K
Expense: Fit-up Core B $200K
Expense: Asset write-offs $1,450K
Expense: Move tenants to new location $160K
Space elsewhere for tenants
Consolidate Warranty, Repair, Reutilization (WRR) in Core A
* Operational Advantage: Consolidation of similar tasks offers economies of scale
More effective/flexible utilization of labor
* Financial Implications: Expense: Consolidation and Move $140K
Consolidate Storage Shelf Build to Core A
* Operational Advantage: Consolidation of similar tasks offers economies of scale
More effective/flexible utilization of labor
* Customer Advantage: Improved predictability & responsiveness
* Financial Implications: Expense: Consolidation and Move
Move SR183 from Dascomb Road to Salem
Currently, all finished products are shipped to another local building, "Dascomb Road" (DAS),
approximately a twenty minute drive from the Salem facility. DAS has, among other functions,
the responsibility to consolidate all customer orders manufactured at the Salem facility and ship
the orders to the customer. One to three days are added to the order cycle time by sending
products to DAS, consolidating them, and shipping them to the customer. Transporting material
from Salem to DAS adds to the cost of the manufacturing and shipping process due to additional
trucking costs as well as additional administrative work that needs to be done to track the
material between the two sites. The management of Salem hopes to eliminate these additional
days on the order cycle time process and additional costs by bringing all the order consolidation
and shipping responsibilities back to Salem.
* Operational Advantage: Vertical integration facilitates better inventory control
Increased visibility and proximity to factory
Improves predictability
Reduces order cycle time
* Customer Advantage: 1-3 day cycle time improvement
Improved predictability and responsiveness
* Financial Implications: Expense: De-fit, racking, fit-up, etc. $76K
Savings: Labor $100K
Savings: Freight $170K
Savings: DAS occupancy and pallet charge $130K
Move Stockroom 10 (Systems Options Only) to Core B
Dascomb Road is also responsible for receiving and shipping all "non-embedded" options for all
orders placed through the Salem facility. Non-embedded options are parts and components that a
customer may order for a system but are not installed inside that system. For example, a
customer may order a Deskside server with a number of hard drives installed, but may also wish
$223K
to have an additional, external hard drive shipped with the order. This additional external hard
drive would be classified as a "non-embedded option."
The management of Salem also hopes to store most of the non-embedded options in the Salem
facility to allow an order to be shipped complete directly to the customer, thereby bypassing
DAS entirely. This change should reduce the total order cycle time, which should allow for
greater order predictability.
* Operational Advantage: Vertical integration
Increased visibility and proximity to factory
Improves predictability
Reduces order cycle time
* Customer Advantage: 1-3 day cycle time improvement
Improved predictability and responsiveness
* Financial Implications: Capital: Dock doors (5 added) $460K
Capital: Core B fit-up $300K
Expense: 15 new people in Salem $750K
Savings: In-transit merge /DAS $1,412K
Savings: Short-ship/Mis-ship Improvements $120K
Implement SAM for all High-Volume Products
An effort to implement a new type of manufacturing cell for the high volume, SBU products is
underway. The Salem Assembly Module (SAM) brings a larger amount of inventory to the floor
and directly into a manufacturing cell optimized for quick changeover. Previously, an individual
operator at a workbench would assemble a high volume SBU product. The operator would have
a "kitted" bin of parts necessary for the completion of the order brought to him/her from a parts
kitting area.
Under the new SAM system, all components necessary for assembly of a product are stored at
the manufacturing cell. Also, the SAM cell is flexible so that products can be assembled by an
individual operator or in a progressive line assembly process.
The SAM cells bring increased visibility to the amount of material being used and should help to
prevent many of the stock-outs. There are expected gains in operator efficiency, which increase
the capacity of the plant, and there are significant material handling savings, due to the
elimination of kitting parts in a bin in a separate area of the facility. Finally, there is a one-time
inventory saving due to the improved material control of the SAM cell.
* Operational Advantage: Improved inventory control
Fewer stock-outs through redundant Kan-Ban
25% increase in manufacturing capacity
60% fewer kitters required
More manufacturing flexibility
* Customer Advantage: Cycle time reduction
Improved predictability
* Financial Implications: Capital: Equipment $925K
Expense: Fit-up $350K
Expense: IS contract personnel $60K
Expense: NIO implementation team $322
Savings: Inventory carrying costs $1,846K
Savings: Inventory cycle time $431K
Savings: SAM headcount $1,504K
Total Expense, Capital, and Savings Summary
Reengineering Program Expenses
Consolidate Manufacturing. Processes $390K
Implement Salem Assembly Module $732 K
Move Tenants $160 K
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move $1,450 K
Defit Core B $557 K
Refit Core B $200 K
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO $76 K
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C) $750 K
Sub-Total $4,315 K
Reengineering Capital Reauirements
Capital - Dock Doors $460 K:
* Exterior construction $200 K
* Interior construction $150 K
* Door Equipment and hardware $110 K
Capital - Core B $630 K:
* Core B fit-up $300 K
* Computer network installation $330 K
Capital - AKO Fit-up $1,200 K:
* Dock Door & Exterior Constr. $320 K
* Lab Fit-Up $630 K
* Network installation $250 K
Salem Assembly Module Equipment $925 K
Total $3,215 K
Reengineering Savings (Year 0)
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C) $1,604 K
Freight Savings for Shipping Move $170 K
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings $472 K
In-transit Merge Minimization-DEC $168 K
In-transit Merge Minimization-Customer $672 K
Short-ship/Mis-ship Improvements $120 K
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM $2,277 K
Total Savings $5,483 K
Following are the Net Present Value models created for the five different iterations. The lower-
right hand corner in each spreadsheet shows the cumulative Net Present Value for each iteration.
Americas Manufacturing & Distribution
Salem Plant Reengineering Program
SavingslCost Analysis - $K
Iteration 1 Total Digital
Relocate the ESE Group to AKO and Relocate the NSTG Group to ZKO.
Move third tenant
Move Shipping and Options to Core B
Reengineering Program Savings: Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C) 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
Freight Savings for Shipping Move 170 170 170 170 170 170
DAS Warehouse Savings for Shipping 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings 472 472 472 472 472 472
Intransit Merge Minimization-DEC 168 168 168 168 168 168
Intransit Merge Minimization-Customer 672 672 672 672 672 672
Shortship/Misship Improvements 120 120 120 120 120 120
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM 2277 431 431 431 431 431
Total Savings 5483 3637 3637 3637, 3637 3637
Reengineering Program Costs:
Consolidate Mfg. Processes 390 0 0 0 0 0
Implement Salem Assembly Module 732 0 0 0 0 0
Move Tenants 160 0 0 0 0 0
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move 1450 0 0 0 0 0
Defit Core B 557 0 0 0 0 0
Refit Core B 200 0 0 0 0 0
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO 76 0 0 0 0 0
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C) 750 750 750 750 750 750
Sub-Total 4315 750 750 750 750 750
Reengineering Capital Requirements: $
Capital Depreciation-Dock Doors 460 44 42 39 37 35 33
Capital Depreciation-SAM 925 206 180 154 128 103 77
Capital Depreciation-Core B 630 140 123 105 88 70 53
Capital Depreciation-AKO 1200 267 233 200 167 133 100
Sub-Total 321 656 577 499 420 '341 262
Other Program Expenses:
Loss of Tenant Rent 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Cost 4971 1327 1249 1170 1091 1012
Net Program Savings/(Loss) 512 2310 2388 2467 2546 2625
Cumulative Program Savings/(Loss) 512 2822 5210 7677 10223
Cash Flow Analysis:
Add Back Depreciation 5 57 499 420 341 262
Add Back Asset Writeoff 1450 0 0 0 0 0
Less Capital Outlay 3215 0 0 0 0 0
Equals Cash Flow - Annual (597) 2887 2887 2887 2887 2887
Equals Cash Flow Cumulative 2290 5177 8064 10951
Net Present Value @20% - Annual (597) 2405 2004 1672 1392
Net Present Value @20% - Cumulative 1808 3811 5483 6875
Payback Period - Months
Americas Manufacturing & Distribution
Salem Plant Reengineering Program
Savings/Cost Analysis - $K
Iteration 2 Total Digital
New Building Addition
Compress Tenants in Core B/Move Shipping & Options to Core A/B
Move Plant Admin in Core A to New Building
Reengineering Program Savings:
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C)
Freight Savings for Shipping Move
DAS Warehouse Savings for Shipping
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings
Intransit Merge Minimization-DEC
Intransit Merge Minimization-Customer
Shortship/Misship Improvements
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM
Total Savings
Reengineering Program Costs:
Consolidate Mfg. Processes
Implement Salem Assembly Module
Move Tenants
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move
Defit Core B
Refit Core B
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C)
Sub-Total
Reengineering Capital Requirements:
Capital Depreciation-Dock Doors
Capital Depreciation-SAM
Capital Depreciation-Core B
Capital Depreciation-New Building
Sub-Total
Other Program Expenses:
Incremental Operating Cost - New Building
Total Cost
Net Program Savings/(Loss)
Cumulative Program Savings/(Loss)
Cash Flow Analysis:
Add Back Depreciation
Add Back Asset Writeoff
Less Capital Outlay
Equals Cash Flow - Annual
Equals Cash Flow Cumulative
Net Present Value @20% - Annual
Net Present Value @20% - Cumulative
Payback Period - Months
$K
460
925
850
2800
5035
Year u
1604
170
0
472
168
672
120
2277
Year 1
1604
170
0
472
168
672
120
431
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
1604 1604 1604 160
170 170 170 17
0
472
168
672
120
431
0
472
168
672
120
431
0
472
168
672
120
431
'4
'0
0
472
168
672
120
431
5483 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637
390
732
100
500
200
200
76
750
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
750 750 750 750 750
2948 750, 750 750 750 750
44 42 39 37 35 33
206 180 154 128 103 77
189 165 142 118 94 71
267 253 240 227 213 200
705 640 575 510 446 381
350 350 350 350 350 350
4003 1740 1675 1610 1546 1481
1480 1897 1962 2027 2091 2156
1480 3377 5339 735 945T
705 40 575 510 445 381
500 0 0 0 0 0
5035 0 0 0 0 0(2350) 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
(2350) 2113 1761 1469 1223
(237) 1524 2993 424J O
Americas Manufacturing & Distribution
Salem Plant Reengineering Program
Savings/Cost Analysis - $K
Iteration 3 Total Digital
Compress Tenants
Move Shipping/Keep Options in Das
100% SAM Implementation
Reengineering Program Savings: Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C) 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
Freight Savings for Shipping Move 170 170 170 170 170 170
DAS Warehouse Savings for Shipping 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intransit Merge Minimization-DEC 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intransit Merge Minimization-Customer 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shortship/Misship Improvements 120 120 120 120 120 120
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM 2277 431 431 431 431 431
Total Savings 4171 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325
Reengineering Program Costs:
Consolidate Mfg. Processes 390 0 0 0 0 0
Implement Salem Assembly Module 732 0 0 0 0 0
Compress Tenants 100 0 0 0 0 0
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move 500 0 0 0 0 0
Defit Core B 0 0 0 0 0 0
Refit Core B 0 0 0 0 0 0
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO 76 0 0 0 0 0
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-Total 1798 0 0 0 ' 0
Reengineering Capital Requirements: $
Capital Depreciation-Dock Doors 410 39 37 35 33 31 29
Capital Depreciation-SAM 925 206 180 154 128 103 77
Capital Depreciation-Core B 150 33 29 25 21 17 13
Capital Depreciation-AKO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-Total 185 278' 246 214 182 151 119
Other Program Expenses:
Loss of Tenant Rent 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Cost 2078 248 214 182 151 119
Net Program Savings/(Loss) 2095 2079 2111 2143 2174 2206
Cumulative Program Savings/(Loss) 2095 4174 6285 8427 10601
Cash Flow Analysis:
Add Back Depreciation 271 246 214 182 151 119
Add Back Asset Writeoff 500 0 0 0 0 0
Less Capital Outlay 1485 0 0 0 0 0
Equals Cash Flow -Annual 1388 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325
Equals Cash Flow Cumulative 3713 . 38 8363 10688
Net Present Value @20% - Annual 1388 1937 1614 1346 1121
Net Present Value @20% - Cumulative 3325,' 4938, 6284 7405'
Payback Period - Months 6
Americas Manufacturing & Distribution
Salem Plant Reengineering Program
Savings/Cost Analysis - $K
Iteration 4 Total Digital
Build New Addition
Move Tenants to New Building
Move Shipping & Options to Core B
Reengineering Program Savings: Year 0 Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C) 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
Freight Savings for Shipping Move 170 170 170 170 170 170
DAS Warehouse Savings for Shipping 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings 472 472 472 472 472 472
Intransit Merge Minimization-DEC 168 168 168 168 168 168
Intransit Merge Minimization-Customer 672 672 672 672 672 672
Shortship/Misship Improvements 120 120 120 120 120 120
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM 2277 431 431 431 431 431
Total Savings 5483 367 3637 3637 3637 3637
Reengineering Program Costs:
Consolidate Mfg. Processes 390 0 0 0 0 0
Implement Salem Assembly Module 732 0 0 0 0 0
Move Tenants 100 0 0 0 0 0
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move 1450 0 0 0 0 0
Defit Core B 557 0 0 0 0 0
Refit Core B 200 0 0 0 0 0
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO 76 0 0 0 0 0
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C) 750 750 750 750 750 750
Sub-Total 4255 750 750 750 750 750
Reengineering Capital Requirements: $K
Capital Depreciation-Dock Doors 460 44 42 39 37 35 33
Capital Depreciation-SAM 925 206 180 154 128 103 77
Capital Depreciation-Lab/Admin/Core B 2182 485 424 364 303 242 182
Capital Depreciation-New Building 2800 267 253 240 227 213 200
Sub-Total 6367 1001 99 797 695 594 492
Other Program Expenses:
Incremental Operating Cost - New Building 350 350 350 350 350 350
Total Cost 5608 1999 1897 1795 1694 1592
Net Program Savings/(Loss) (123) 1638 1740 1842 1943 2045
Cumulative Program Savings/(Loss) (123) 1515 3255 5096 7 404 0
Cash Flow Analysis:
Add Back Depreciation 1001 B99 791 b95 594 492
Add Back Asset Writeoff 1450 0 0 0 0 0
Less Capital Outlay 6367 0 0 0 0 0
Equals Cash Flow - Annual (4039) 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
Equals Cash Flow Cumulative (1502) 1035 3572 6109
Net Present Value @20% - Annual (4039) '2113 1761 1469 1223 1020
Net Present Value @20% - Cumulative (1926) (165) 1304 252.
Payback Period - Months
Americas Manufacturing & Distribution
Salem Plant Reengineering Program
SavingslCost Analysis - $K
Iteration 5 Total Digital
Do Not Move Tenants
Move Shipping/Keep Options in Das
80% SAM Implementation
Reengineering Program Savings:
Reduced Labor - SAM/Shipping (50 H/C)
Freight Savings for Shipping Move
DAS Warehouse Savings for Shipping
DAS W/H & PPS Options Savings
Intransit Merge Minimization-DEC
Intransit Merge Minimization-Customer
Shortship/Misship Improvements
Inventory/Cycle Time Reduction for SAM
Total Savings
Reengineering Program Costs:
Consolidate Mfg. Processes
Implement Salem Assembly Module
Move Tenants
Asset Writeoff for Tenant Move
Defit Core B
Refit Core B
Move Shipping from DAS to NIO
Distribute Options from Salem (15 H/C)
Sub-Total
Reeng-ineering Capital Requirements:
Capital Depreciation-Dock Doors
Capital Depreciation-SAM
Capital Depreciation-Core B
Capital Depreciation-AKO
Sub-Total
Other Program Expenses:
Loss of Tenant Rent
Total Cost
Net Program Savings/(Loss)
$K
410
875
0
0
1285
Cumulative Program Savings/(Loss)
Cash Flow Analysis:
Add Back Depreciation
Add Back Asset Writeoff
Less Capital Outlay
Equals Cash Flow - Annual
Equals Cash Flow Cumulative
Net Present Value @20% - Annual
Net Present Value @20% - Cumulative
Payback Period - Months
1304
170
0
0
0
0
120
388
1982
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
1304
170
0
0
0
0
120
2054
3648
390
712
0
0
0
0
76
0
1178
39 37
194 170
0 0
0 0
233 207
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
'0
181 155 128 102
0 0 0 0 0 0
1411 207 181 155 128 102
2237 1775 1801 1827 1854 1880
'2237 4011" 5812 7640 9493
233 207 181 155 128 102
0 0 0 0 0 0
1285 0 0 0 0 0
1185 1982 1982 1982 1982 1982
31185 67 5149 7131 9113
1185 1651 1376 1148 955 197
2836 4212' "5359 6314 1111
1304 1304 1304 1304
170
0
0
0
0
120
388
1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
35
146
0
0
170
0
0
0
0
120
388
1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
33
122
0
0
170 170
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
120 120
388 388
1982 1982
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0' 0
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